'Third World' vs. 'Post-Colonial':
Is 'Decolonization' Possible in 'Post-Colonial' Space?

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Introduction

This study is about postcolonial*ism* as theory of postcolonial*ity*. I am particularly interested in postcolonial theories, for they challenge the very notion of 'Third World.' This challenge is especially important to liberation theologies in general, because the rise of liberation theologies was directly related to the emergence of national and political liberation movements in the 'Third World.' Some have already replaced the 'Third World' with 'Two-Thirds World' for various reasons. (One particular reason is that the 'Second World' no longer exists.) Still, I insist on retaining the term 'Third World,' for it symbolizes what Ella Shohat calls "a common project of linked resistance to neo/colonialisms."[2] In this study, therefore, I would like to examine the value and limit of postcolonial theories as politics of resistance. I will do that by investigating some of the critical issues that are being disputed between ardent proponents of postcolonial theories and their critics.

'Third World" and 'postcolonial'

Aijaz Ahmad, Ella Shohat, Anne McClintock, Masao Miyoshi, and Arif Dirlik appear skeptical of postcolonial theories, whereas Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Stuart Hall stand on the other side. Critiques from Ahmad, Shohat, and Dirlik can be summarized by saying that postcolonial theories are: (1) (apolitical) culturalism; (2) First World post-structuralism; (3) anti-structural; (4) disconnected from anti-colonial/anti-neocolonial; (5) absent of oppositional possibility; (6) denying collective human agency; (7) essentializing identity through difference; (8) transhistorical (ambiguity of spatiality and problematic temporality); (9) re-centering global history around the single rubric of European time; (10) confusing postmodern alienation as 'hybridity,' 'contingency,' and 'postcoloniality'; (11) universalizing 'displacement' (migration); and (12) resonating the conceptual needs of global capitalism.[3] These points of critique are, of course, deeply intertwined. The focus of my attention is: What is the true nature of postcoloniality in contemporary global capitalism and how is it related to anti-neo/colonialisms? (1), (4), (10), and (12) seem directly relevant to this question.

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[2] Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'," Padmini Mongia. ed. *Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader* (London and New York: Arnold, 1996), 332.

[3] This abstraction is based on their articles: Aijaz Ahmad, "The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality"; Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism"; and Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'" all in Padmini Mongia, ed., *Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*. (London and New York: Arnold, 1996).

Ahmad reminds us that the first major debate on the idea of postcolonialism took place not in *cultural* theory but in *political* theory, with the object of inquiry being not 'postcolonial literature' or the 'postcolonial intellectual' but the 'postcolonial state.'[4] Edward W. Said also acknowledges that the earliest studies of the post-colonial were, by such distinguished thinkers as Anwar Abdel Malek, Samir Amin, and C.L.R. James, almost all based on *studies of domination and control* done from the standpoint of either a completed political independence or an incomplete liberationist project.[5] Ahmad observes, however, that as the term 'postcolonial' and 'postcolonial*ism*' resurfaced during the 1980s, this time in literary and cultural theories and in deconstructive forms of history-writing, and as these terms were then conjoined with a newly coined 'postcolonial*ity*,' this resurfacing included no memory that the term had come into being in the first place as not *cultural* theory but *political* theory.[6]

Dirlik contends that it is the denial of capitalism's foundational status that makes the postcolonialist argument a *culturalism.*[7] He points out that postcolonial criticism has been silent on the relationship of the idea of postcolonialism to its context in contemporary capitalism.[8] In a similar vein, Shohat contends that postcolonial theory has not addressed the politics of location of the very term 'post-colonial.'[9] Thus, Dirlik argues that with the repudiation of capitalism and structure as foundational categories, there is no mention of a capitalist structuring of the world as a constituting moment of history.[10] According to Dirlik, denying capitalism's foundational status results in the repudiation of the 'Third World.'[11] Shohat echoes Dirlik that the wide adaptation of the 'post-colonial' during the late 1980s was coincident with eclipsing paradigm of the 'Third World.'[12]

As a matter of fact, Shohat does not deny the crisis in 'Third World' thinking—i.e., the three worlds theory that "flattens heterogeneities, masks contradictions, and elides differences."[13] Thus, for Shohat, the enthusiasm for the term 'post-colonial' is a mirror of this crisis in 'Third World' thinking.[14] In a similar vein, Dirlik accepts that 'post-coloniality' represents a response to a genuine need—i.e., the need to overcome a crisis of understanding produced by the inability of old categories to account for the world.[15] Indeed, as Shohat observes, the last three decades in the 'Third World' have offered "a number of very complex and politically ambiguous developments"—i.e., the realization that the wretched of the earth are not unanimously revolutionary, that despite the broad patterns of geo-political hegemony, power relations in the Third World are also dispersed and contradictory, and that conflicts are prevailing not only between nations

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[4] Aijaz, Ahmad, "The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality." Padmini Mongia. ed. *Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader* (London and New York: Arnold, 1996), 280.
[5] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 349.
[6] Ibid., 281.
[7] Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," Padmini Mongia, ed., *Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader* (London and New York: Arnold, 1996), 307.
[8] Ibid., 295-296.
[9] Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'," 321.
[10] Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura," 299.
[11] Ibid., 307.
[12] Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'," 322.
[13] Ibid., 322-323.
[14] Ibid., 323.
[15] Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura," 353.

but also within nations with the constantly changing relations between dominant and subaltern groups.[16] And this is exactly why Stuart Hall reproaches Shohat that instead of this observation provoking an examination of the potential value of the term 'post-colonial' in precisely referencing *this shift* theoretically, she ends with a polemically negative observation about the visibility of the 'post-colonial' in Anglo-American academic cultural studies.[17]

Nonetheless, Shohat insists on retaining the term 'Third World,' for with all its problems, she believes that it does retain heuristic value as a convenient label for the imperialized formations, including those within the First World.[18] She is convinced that the concept of 'Third World' is schematically productive, if it is placed under erasure, seen as provisional and ultimately inadequate.[19] She believes that the term 'Third World' denotes "a common project of linked resistance to neo/colonialisms."[20] As a matter of fact, Shohat does not identify either 'Third World' wrong or 'postcolonial' right, and vice versa; instead, she posits that each conceptual frame illuminates only partial aspects of systemic modes of domination, of overlapping collective identities, and of contemporary global relations.[21] In this sense, she achieves a basic synthesis—i.e., "the flexible yet critical usage [of 'Third World'] which can address the politics of location *not only* for pointing out historical and geographical contradictions and differences *but also* for reaffirming historical and geographical links, structural analogies, and opening for agency and resistance [my italics]."[22] Still, can a "flexible yet critical usage" of the 'Third World' address what she herself admits is "a number of very complex and politically ambiguous developments"? Is 'Third World' only an old wineskin for new wine?

It is intriguing to observe that the argument of 'Third World' vs. 'post-colonial' is interrupted by Inderpal Grewal and Caren Laplan, who are the proponents of 'transnational' feminism. They argue that substituting 'postcolonial' for 'Third World' *without deconstructing the production and reception* of the former term will also result in the same problem of a "flattening of heterogeneities."[23] In its current usage in the humanities, they observe that 'postcolonial' does not imply a critique of colonialism but *a way of denying that colonialism continues in various forms at the present time*.[24] Such a usage, however, cannot connect the older colonial economic period to the one we live in now, a distinctly different *yet related* world economic system dominated by such entities as the IMF and other global economic and cultural agencies.[25] If colonialism is only

[16] Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'."
[17] Stuart Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial'?: Thinking At the Limit," Iain Chambers and Curti Lidia, eds., *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies/Divided Horizons* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 245.
[18] Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'," 332.
[19] Ibid., 332.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Inderpal Grewal and Laplan Caren, *Scattered hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 14.
[24] Ibid., 15.
[25] Ibid.

'post,' they argue, the diversity, vitality, and visibility of current liberation movement are minimized or erased.[26]

Grewal and Laplan emphasize that 'transnational' linkages influence every level of social existence,[27] and 'transnational' economic structures affect everyone in the global economy.[28] Indeed, they seem to close to Ahmad, Dirlik, and Shohat in the sense that they pay considerable attention to economic structures; nonetheless, they are also close to Hall and other postcolonial theorists because their eventual point of focus is transnational *cultural* identity. Thus, for Grewal and Laplan, 'postcolonial' can serve as a term that positions *cultural production* in the fields of 'transnational' economic relations and diasporic identity construction.[29] Only then is the 'postcolonial' particularly useful in projects that delineate fields of reception *in the West*, for critiques of Western reception can deconstruct the aesthetic and political mystiques that govern the marketing and distribution of cultural artifacts from the 'Third World.'[30]

As we have seen, Dirlik refuses '*post*-colonial,' for it repudiates a capitalist structuring of the world as a constitutive moment of history. Shohat refuses '*post*-colonial' in order to reaffirm "historical and geographical links, structural analogies, and opening for agency and resistance." Grewal and Laplan refuse '*post*-colonial,' for it "cannot connect the older colonial economic period to the one we live in now." So one salient commonality among these critiques to '*post*-colonial' is that they all emphasize continuities more than discontinuities between, before and after the official colonial era. Still, the unsolved issue is how one can perceive and describe what Shohat calls "a number of very complex and politically ambiguous developments during the last three decades in the 'Third World'" *in the context of* what Grewal and Laplan call "the 'transnational' linkages and economic structures that influence every level of social existence and affect everyone in the global economy." Indeed, this is the question as to how we deal with what Hall calls "the potential value of the term 'post-colonial' in referencing this shift theoretically." The heart of the issue, then, has to do with what the 'post' in 'post-colonial' genuinely means. In fact, it is the prefix 'post' that has caused major controversy, dispute, and hermeneutical confusion.

The 'post' in 'postcolonial'

Seeing postmodernism as a new way of understanding the multiplication of distinctions that flows from the need to clear oneself a space, Anthony Kwame Appiah is assured that the *post* in postcolonial is, like the *post* in postmodern, the *post* of the *space-clearing gesture*.[31] He reveals that many areas of contemporary African cultural life—i.e., what has come to be theorized as 'popular culture,' in particular—are not in this way concerned with transcending, or with going beyond, coloniality.[32] Although the popular culture is also a byproduct of international exchange of commodities, he assures that its

[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid., 13.
[28] Ibid., 15.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 145, 149.
[32] Ibid., 149

'syncretism' is not a consequence of a space-clearing gesture, for there is no antecedent practice whose claim to exclusivity of vision should be rejected.[33] Thus, for Appiah, postcoloniality is the condition of what he ungenerously calls a comprador intelligentsia—i.e., the condition of a relatively small, Western-style, Western-trained, group of writers and thinkers who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery.[34] Why then has this space-clearing gesture become so central to them? His answer is that it has to do with the sense in which art (culture) is increasingly commodified—in other words, in order to sell oneself and one's products as art (culture) in the marketplace, it is important, above all, to clear a space in which one is distinguished from other producers and products, and one does this by the construction and the marking of difference.[35]

Asking whether '*post*-colonial' marks the ruptural point between two epistemes in intellectual history (epistemological) or refers to the strict chronologies of history all in short (chronological), Shohat contends that the emphasis should be given on "the new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices, not on a 'beyond.'"[36] Shohat clearly prefers 'post' as epistemological rather than chronological, for she consistently emphasizes the *structural conflicts* that persist beyond chronological distinction.[37] From this perspective, she proposes replacing the term 'post-colonial theory' with the term 'post First/Third Worlds theory' or 'post-anti-colonial critique'—a more nuanced term that describes a movement beyond a relatively binaristic, fixed and stable mapping of power relations between 'colonizer/colonized' and 'center/periphery.'[38] Here the prefix 'post' makes sense, she contends, less as 'after' than as following, going beyond, and commenting upon a certain intellectual movement—third worldist anti-colonial critique—rather than beyond a certain point in history—colonialism.[39] Only then, she concludes, 'neo-colonialism' would be a less passive form of addressing the situation of neo-colonized countries, and a politically more active mode of engagement.[40]

Hall, on the contrary, argues that the 'post' is not only 'going beyond' *but also* 'after' the colonial, as postmodernism is both 'going beyond' and 'after' modernism, and post-structuralism both follows chronologically and achieves its theoretical gains 'on the back of' structuralism.[41] Holding both 'after' (chronological) and 'going beyond' (epistemological), he argues that the tension between the two is not disabling but productive.[42] For Hall, the 'after' does not mean that the "after-effects [sic]" of colonial rule have somehow been suspended.[43] Nevertheless, for Hall, the 'after' claims that *some*

[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 143.
[36] Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'"
[37] Ibid., 327.
[38] Ibid., 329.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial'?," 243.
[42] Ibid., 254.
[43] Jace Weaver, a Native American scholar, critiques this specific word of "after-effects" of Hall: "The problem is that from much of that two-thirds of the world colonialism is not dead. It is not living as "after-effects," as Hall implies. Native Americans remain a colonized people, victims of internal colonialism…. Today, Native American life is characterized by the same paternalistic colonialism that has marked it for over a century. The heavy hand of federal plenary power still rests heavily upon Native American affairs."

other, related but as yet emergent new configurations of power-knowledge relations are beginning to exert their distinctive and specific effects.[44] The characteristic of the way of conceptualizing these new configurations of power-knowledge relations, however, for Hall, is not an epistemological 'break,' but a "movement of deconstruction-reconstruction" (Gramsci) or, in a more deconstructive sense, "double inscription" (Derrida).[45] Thus, for Hall, what the concept of the *post*colonial has done so much to bring to the fore is precisely this "double inscription" which breaks down the clearly demarcated inside/outside of the colonial system.[46] Indeed, what Hall attempts to construct here is *a notion of a shift conceptualized as the reconfiguration of a field*, rather than as a movement of linear transcendence between two mutually exclusive states.[47] For Hall, therefore, the 'post-colonial' is not a conventional paradigm of a logico-deductive type that confuses the chronological and the epistemological;[48] rather, it is *a choice* between epistemologies—i.e., between a rational and successive (constructive) logic and a deconstructive one.[49] Hall, of course, has opted for the latter.

While Shohat emphasizes 'rigidly,' if you will, on the *structural consistency* between colonial and neocolonial periods, Hall focuses 'lightheartedly,' if you will, on the *distinctive and specific characteristics* of emerging configurations of power-knowledge relations. Thus, for Shohat, it is *neo*colonial that requires our epistemological discretion on "the new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices" without implying any chronological division; on the contrary, for Hall, it is *post*colonial that requires our epistemological reconfiguration on the "some other, related but as yet emergent new configurations of power-knowledge relations" with a clear sense of chronological rupture—'after.' In fact, like Shohat, Hall also tries to synthesize "the over-determining effects of the colonial moment" with "the differentiation and specificity"—indeed, he urges us to keep these two ends of the chain in play at the same time, lest we fall into a playful deconstructionism, the fantasy of a powerless utopia of difference.[50] The only difference between Hall and Shohat seems, then, their points of departure; yet, they arrive at two different terminal stations. Indeed, lying behind is, as Hall assumes, "a deeper choice" between two different epistemologies. Is then Hall's choice new wineskin for new wine? Do we really have new wine?

Hall assures us that we are living in "new times" in which both the crisis of the uncompleted struggle for 'decolonization' and the crisis of the 'post-independence' state are deeply inscribed.[51] Accepting Dirlik's critique that the consideration of the relationship between postcolonialism and global capitalism is remarkably lacking in

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(Weaver, ed., *Native American Religious Identity: Unforgotten Gods* [Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1998], 13f.) I take this in footnote, for I do not see that Hall overlooks the seriousness of the effects of colonialism. In fact, he says that "we cannot afford to forget the over-determining effects of the colonial moment." The issue for me is not whether one takes the effects of colonialism seriously or not but rather, *how* one takes them epistemologically and chronologically.

[44] Ibid., 254.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., 247.
[47] Ibid., 254.
[48] Ibid., 255.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., 249.
[51] Ibid., 244.

postcolonial theories,[52] Hall urges that post-colonial writers investigate the relationship between the post-colonial and the analysis of the "new developments in global capitalism."[53] However, it seems to me that Hall does not make any connection between what he calls the "new times" (in which both the crisis of the uncompleted struggle for 'decolonization' and the crisis of the 'post-independence' state are deeply inscribed) and the "new developments in global capitalism." What is the relationship between these "new times" and this "new development in global capitalism"? What are the "new" developments in current global capitalism? Is current development of global capitalism "new"—if so, how? How are they related to the *double crises* of the uncompleted struggle for 'decolonization' and the 'post-independence' state? What is the role and effect of the "new development in global capitalism" to the "crisis of the 'post-independence' state"? The heart of the question regarding *post*-colonial lies in this question regarding "new." Consider, then, how William Greider, an economist who wrote a marvelous book on globalization, depicts the world today:

> Today the world is divided by three different planes of consciousness in terms of how people think about time. The global financial market and its electronic participants are trading continuously around the clock and no longer pause to recognize day or night. Most people in modern society are measuring time in segments of hours and days, weeks or months. But the indigenous people among us continue to think and function according to the ancient cycles of seasons.[54]

Whose time are we living in? Whose time is dominant? Will the time of global financial market and its electronic participants eventually conquer the whole globe?

Whatever the answers may be, I can make an affirmative remark: We are never living *in* "new times." As Ecclesiastes say, "There is no new thing under the sun." (1:9). We are, in fact, living *with* different planes of time consciousness that are competing with one another. People are talking about the "21st century," as if some 'new' quality of time is at the threshold. But, isn't the "21st century" only an arbitrary projection of time by the 'Christian' West? For Jews, the year 2,000 is 5,761 (thus 58th century) according to their calendar. For Buddhists, it is 2,561 (thus middle of 26th century) since Buddha was born; for Muslims, it is 1,378 (thus 14th century) after the birth of Mohammed; and for Koreans, it is 4,333 (thus the end of the first trisection of the 44th century) since *Tangoon* established the first kingdom in the Korean peninsula. What is falling apart here is the *chronological* time that survives only through the "space-clearing gesture"—the 'post'--of antecedent time. I reject it, for in this time plane, the rule of "first come, first served" perpetuates the domination of somebody who is said to be 'ahead' over against somebody who is said to be 'behind.' In this incommodious, smothered, flat, and straightforward line, 'the first' sets up the norm, rule, and regulations to those who are 'behind.'[55] This is exactly what the colonizers have done.

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[52] Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura."
[53] Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial'?," 257.
[54] William Greider, *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (Simon & Schuster, 1997), 349.
[55] The QWERTY theory is a best example to elaborate this. Q, W, E, R, T, and Y are the keys arranged from left to right which in fact has nothing to do with the best efficiency for finger movement. Somebody

Hall argues that colonization was neither local nor marginal sub-plot in some larger story, but the place and significance of a major, extended, and ruptural world-historical event.[56] Assuring that the 'post-colonial' offers, in addition to identifying the *post-decolonization moment* as critical for a shift in global relations, *an alternative narrative of Modernity itself*,[57] Hall re-narrativizes colonization as "the whole process of expansion, exploration, conquest, colonization and imperial hegemonization which constituted the 'outer face,' the constitutive outside, of European and then Western capitalist modernity after 1492."[58] Thus, for Hall, this perspective of 'post-colonial' is the retrospective rephrasing of Modernity *within the framework of globalization* in all its various ruptural forms and moments.[59] This is truly the distinctive element in a 'post-colonial' periodization, according to Hall.[60] Still, what is the relationship between the 'post-colonial' as "the post-decolonization moment as a critical shift in global relations" and the 'post-colonial' as "the rephrasing of Modernity within the framework of globalization"? When does true 'post-colonial' begin, if the 'post-colonial' includes *both* post-decolonization moment *and* whole process of colonization as the process of constitution of Western capitalist modernity after 1492? Furthermore, does Hall assume that globalization has nothing to do with the "post-decolonization moment"?

On globalization

First and foremost, it is imperative to recognize the intrinsic connection between colonization, globalization, and what Hall calls "new developments in global capitalism." Globalization is the key to recognize the undergirding connection of them. Indeed, globalization is *not new* in human history. It began in 1492 when Columbus 'discovered' America—thus, opened up the era of colonization. The first stage of globalization, initiated by mercantile trade, was the globalization *of agriculture and food*. As Agus Salim, the first Indonesian ambassador to Great Britain, answered the question regarding his smoking cigarette to one gentleman in a diplomatic reception in London about 50 years ago, "That [the kretek, which is an Indonesian cigarette spiced with clove] is the reason for which the West conquered the world!"[61] According to Patrick Maning, the most lucrative slave trade in 1500-1800 C.E.—e.g., the Mediterranean Islamic slave trade out of Africa, the Atlantic slave trade, enslavement of Native Americans, slave trade in British colonial North America, the Portuguese Southern Atlantic slave trade, slave trade in the Persian Gulf, and so on—was the globalization *of forced labor*.[62] The outset of modern globalization was the English industrial revolution launched in the late 18th century by steam power, steel, mechanized textile looms, and the first railroads.[63] The

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designed it as it is, and once it is *authorized*, billions of others, including me, who learn to typewrite must follow that order.

[56] Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial'?," 249.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 250.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "The Book That Killed Colonialism," *New York Times*.
[62] See Patrick Maning, ed., *Slave Trades, 1500-1800: Globalization of Forced Labour* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Brookfield, VT.: Variorum, 1996).
[63] Greider, *One World, Ready or Not*.

great wave of industrial inventions in the latter 19th century—e.g., electrical generation, internal combustion engines, cars, telephones, radio, and flight—spawned, according to Greider, the globalization *of industrial production.*[64]

The current globalization *of laissez-faire economy* is the highest stage of the five hundred-year-old globalization as Western expansion, colonization, and neo-colonization since 1492. This globalization *of free market economy* has been accelerated explosively since 1980, particularly since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. According to Greider, the basic mechanism of the current globalization is *the free flow of capital across borders* in staggering volumes.[65] It is, indeed, finance capital—the trading of stocks, bonds, and currencies, etc.--whose solitary principle is maximizing the return on capital without regard to national identity or political and social consequences, that has accelerated the current globalization at an astonishing pace.[66] As C.T. Kurien identifies, the possibility of such quick, unexpected and often massive inflow and outflow of privately controlled capital is the essence of what now goes on today in the name of "globalization."[67] Indeed, globalization finds its purest expression in the realm of finance capital. Greider asserts that in the history of the long expansionary cycles of capitalism, it is finance capital that usually rules in the final stage, displacing the inventors and industrialists who launched the era, eclipsing the power of governments to manage the course of economic events.[68]

What, then, is the driving force behind globalization? What has motivated such an astonishing flow of privately controlled capital as well as radical dispersion of industrial production all around the globe? Greider affirms that the answer is intrinsic to capitalism —i.e., the supply problem, which is the most central to capitalism, and the destabilization of the value of money itself, which is the very core of capitalism. As we know, the gap between supply and demand in market is a constant problem in capitalism. Overcapacity grows because productive supply is expanding faster than demand.[69] The overriding fact is then gross surplus of capacity--and this productive overcapacity is, according to Greider, neither temporary nor diminishing, but permanent.[70] It is this problem of permanent excess supply as well as relentless pressure on profits, which is in fact the central paradox of the industrial revolution that is one of the driving forces behind the current globalization. Companies have systematically dispersed their production base to many different countries in order to create a straddle that would insulate them from the recurring price shocks of floating exchange rates.[71] Greider also reveals that the instability of money itself, which is the very core of capitalism, is a major force driving the globalization of industrial production.

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[64] Ibid., 16.
[65] Ibid., 234.
[66] Ibid., 23. According to Greider, for instance, international bank loans more than quadrupled from 1980 to 1991, reaching US$3.6 trillion; foreign-exchange trading, which was only US$640 billion a day as recently as 1989, almost doubled by the early 1990s, reaching more than US$1.2 trillion a day. (p. 23) Astonishingly, four or five days of this foreign-exchange trading equals the annual output of the whole U.S. economy. (p.234)
[67] C.T. Kurien, "Globalization—What is It About?" *Voices from the Third World*, Vol. XX No. 2, December 1997, 23.
[68] Greider, *One World, Ready or Not*, 227.
[69] Ibid., 112.
[70] Ibid., 104.
[71] Ibid., 250.

It is pointless, therefore, to argue whether globalization is inevitable or not, for, as we have seen, globalization is a *derivative* problem from the central paradox of capitalism. As Greider points out, it is neither an option nor a policy choice of so-called multinationals or global finance investors; it is a *compulsory mechanism* intrinsic to capitalism itself. Therefore, as John S. Pobee argues, the point of issue here is the *model of ideology* by which multinationals and finance capital are "restructuring" the world for their *survival* at least and for their *prosperity* at best.[72] What Hall calls the "*new* development in global capitalism," therefore, has to be analyzed in the context of the *compulsory mechanism* of capitalism that drives forth the globalization and the *model of ideology* that is, in response to it, "restructuring" the world for the survival and prosperity of multinationals and finance capital. What Hall calls the "post-decolonization moment" has to be historicized in this dynamic.

From this perspective, Talal Asad is found wrong to contend that there is no single, privileged narrative of the modern world, and therefore the history of global capitalism is rejected.[73] There *is* a single, old paradigm of globalization as Western expansionism which has changed only its appearance at different times. There *are*, as Dirlik affirms, global forces at work that condition the local in the first place.[74] One basic common history of global capitalism is that as Dalip Swamy indicates, the historic subordination of indigenous peoples and cultures to the 'civilizing mission' of Western nationalism in the form of imperialism.[75] It should be noted that the pressure of globalization of the West has become more and more intense as the economic crisis has been intensified in the 'center,' while the 'periphery' has become the waste dump of this crisis. This is the way beneath the surface how colonization "constituted the 'outer face,' the constitutive outside, of European and then Western capitalist modernity after 1492" (Hall). Ignoring this basic mechanism of transfer of contradiction from the 'center' to the 'periphery,' all *cultural* analyses fall into the pitfall of *culturalism*, which concerns only the horizontal cultural exchanges without considering their vertical dimension of center/margin.

Unfortunately, this kind of flaw can be detected from Hall. Hall suggests that the 'post-colonial' re-reads 'colonization' as part of an *essentially* transnational and transcultural 'global' process, producing a decentered, diasporic, or 'global' rewriting of earlier, nation-centered imperial grand narratives.[76] This implies that the 'post-colonial' basically understands colonization in terms of the *transverse linkages* between and across nation-state frontiers and the global/local inter-relationships.[77] Nonetheless, his idea that the colonization is *essentially* a transnational and transcultural process is greatly puzzling. As a Korean, I have never thought of Japanese colonization of Korea as a transnational and transcultural process *essentially*. That was the very excuse and propaganda of Japanese colonizers. Colonization was *essentially* vertical domination of power,

[72] John S. Pobee, "Theology in the Context of Globalization." *Voices from the Third World*, Vol. XX No. 2, December, 1997, 68.
[73] Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 9.
[74] Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura," 303.
[75] Dalip Swamy, "An Alternative to Globalization," *Voices from the Third World*, Vol. XX No. 2, December 1997, 129.
[76] Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial'?," 247.
[77] Ibid., 250.

knowledge, and culture that was decorated as transnational and transcultural friendship and exchange. Thus, I understand why Masao Miyoshi says cynically that "what we need is a rigorous political and economic scrutiny rather than a gesture of pedagogic expediency, exemplified by the liberal self-deception contained in such new fields as cultural studies and multiculturalism."[78] Indeed, cultural theories always seem to be more manageable than the seemingly hopeless problem of economic alternative. But to concede defeat in the economic arena is to surrender on virtually every political and cultural front.

Hall contends that the 'global' in the 'post-colonial' does not mean universal, but it is not nation-specific or society-specific either. He argues that this 'global' is about how the *lateral and transverse* cross-relations of what Gilroy calls the 'diasporic' supplement and simultaneously displace the center-periphery, and the global-local reciprocally re-organize and re-shape one another.[79] At first look, this idea seems plausible, if we consider the most distinctive characteristic of the current globalization—i.e., interdependence--compared to previous stages of globalization. Interdependence has always been one of the constants of the economic globalization of the world. What makes the current stage of globalization distinctive from those of the past is, however, that while in the past interdependence was limited in geographical extent and quantitative significance, today, as Mietmar Mieth and Marciano Vida assure, it embraces virtually the whole world and conditions all aspects of the economy and human life.[80] I think this interdependence is the heart of postcolonial*ity* that many postcolonial intellectuals are trying to articulate as the ground of their theories. An example is Appiah who assures that "it is too late for us to escape each other, we might instead seek to turn to our advantage the mutual interdependencies history has thrust upon us."[81] From his own life experience, Appiah confesses, "how easy it is, without theory, without much conscious taught, to live in human families that extend across the boundaries that are currently held to divide our race."[82] But, is it true to *all*? Is it that easy, except for a few, to live in a global family across the boundaries?

Interconnected not by free choice

Greider argues that the deepest social meaning of globalization is that people no longer have free choice in the matter of identity,[83] because, *ready or not*, people are all bound to distant others through the complex strands of commerce and finance reorganizing the globe as a unified marketplace.[84] People may wish to turn away from this fact, but, he contends, there is essentially *no place to hide*, not if one lives in any of the industrialized nations.[85] Though major portions of the earth remain on the periphery of the system, he insists that the patterns of global interconnectedness are already the

[78] Recited from Said, *Orientalism*, 349.
[79] Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial?," 247.
[80] Dietmar Mieth and Vidal Marciano, *Outside the Market No Salvation?* (London: SCM Press; Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1997), vii.
[81] Appiah, *In My Father's House*, 72.
[82] Ibid., x.
[83] Greider, *One World, Ready or Not?*, 333.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., 15.

dominant reality.[86] Thus, *like it or not*, according to Greider, the social imperative of globalization is to think anew rather than retreat inward, freeing ourselves from "buried cultural and racial assumptions inherited from the colonialist past."[87] This is not to abandon old identities and deeply held values, he argues, but to enlarge them.[88] Rather, this will require people to imagine themselves on a larger scale to glimpse the all-encompassing possibilities that the global revolution has put before them,[89] because the great paradox of this global revolution is that neither the poor nor the rich are likely to prosper without each other.[90]

However, will globalization guarantee prosperity both to the rich and the poor? The answer is no. We need a deeper analysis of the current globalization in order to see the true nature of the so-called interconnectedness, or interdependence. First, despite the familiar rhetoric about 'free' trade, 'open' market, and a 'liberalized' system, the current globalization is *not at all* a free exchange of commodities based on market price.[91] Greider accepts that the global contexts among enterprises are far more governed by self-interested, political, and arbitrary imperatives rather than a disinterested marketplace ruled by prices and costs. Thus, as Ninan Koshy points out, freedom in the globalized 'free' market is a false freedom.[92] A definite ingredient of freedom must be "free choice" which requires realistic alternatives. Yet, *those who have no resources* have no such alternatives and therefore have no freedom. In this context, John S. Pobee indicates humorously and succinctly, globalization can be compared with a parable of "an elephant dancing on a chicken shouting 'freedom.'"[93] In short, interconnected, or interdependent, all may be, yet, we are interconnected *not* by our free choice *but* by the self-interested, political, and arbitrary imperatives of global enterprises. What kind of interdependence is this?

Second, the globalization of free market economy, strikingly contrary to our expectation, is moving toward *homogenization*. The current globalization is typically identical with the globalization of *the American financial system*. In other words, patterns of economy are being displaced all over the world by the American model. In this sense, globalization *is* Americanization. The 1997 financial panic throughout Asia, including Korea, turned out to be the triumph of the American financial model over that of the Japanese. While several hundred million Asians were suffering from the collapse of their economy, as many Asian newspapers reported, Wall Street celebrated its victory over the Japanese economic model rampant throughout Asia. Despite the notion of multiculturalism, the world is moving toward homogeneity, not heterogeneity, of

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[86] Ibid., 333f.
[87] Ibid., 332, 334.
[88] Ibid., 334.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., 324.
[91] For instance, Greider reports that in 1993, only about 15% of global trade was genuinely conducted in free-market circumstances, while governments directly managed 25 to 30% of trade through their various nontariff barriers, and while multinational corporations themselves managed about 40% of global trade through the intra-firm trade among their own subsidiaries; and while the top 10 trade sectors from aircraft to petroleum, which accounted for 22% of world trade, were managed by governments or concentrated firms. (pp. 137-138)
[92] Ninan Koshy, "The Political Dimensions and Implications of Globalization." *Voices from the Third World*, Vol. XX No. 2, December 1997, 26.
[93] Pobee, "Theology in the Context of Globalization," 71.

economic production, reproduction, and consumption. One cannot say that cultural production, reproduction, and consumption may be an exception. In short, interdependent all may be, nonetheless, we are interconnected *not* by genuine multiculturalism *but* by a homogeneous financial system. What kind of interconnectedness is this?

Third, despite the notion that the patterns of global interconnectedness are already the dominant reality, globalization does not eradicate the margin, periphery—rather, it sustains it, actively reproduces it. As Ninan Koshy observes, globalization and marginalization are nothing but two counter images of the same phenomenon—marginalization being a necessary condition of globalization.[94] The overall result of the new system is that regions, peoples, and states who are not integrated into the globalized framework stand marginalized and excluded.[95] Do we still believe the propaganda that we will all live equally in a global village? We may all be interconnected, nonetheless, *not* in equal status *but* in chain of center-periphery.

Fourth, it is imperative to notice that despite its staggering volume, the financial trading across borders is mostly transacted by a very small community—i.e., the world's largest 30 to 50 banks and a handful of major brokerages that do the actual trades on behalf of investor clients as well as the banks' own portfolios.[96] The new communications technology has accelerated to create this small, elite community of international finance—according to Greider, perhaps no more than 200,000 traders around the world who all speak the same language and recognize a mutuality of interests despite their rivalries.[97] The communications technology enables a handful of 'experts'—namely, Quantum Fund, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers, and Merrill Lynch—to play a video game of electronic money on the computer monitor 24 hours a day. And it is this small community of "global speculators" that have defeated the conventional power blocs—first, laborers, both the organized union workers and wage earners in general; second, national governments, both strong and weak; and third, even multinational corporations, who are pressured by finance capital to adapt to the imperatives of reducing costs and improving rates of return, although they are the muscles and brains of this new global system.[98] Surely, globalization is a process of transition—transition as rearrangement of hegemony. In short, deeply interconnected we may all be, we are so *not* by dispersed, scattered hegemonies *but* by re-centering, re-organizing hegemonies of a handful 'experts' of "global speculators." What kind of interdependence is this?

In summary, in this era of globalization, which is "new development in global capitalism" to Hall, we are deeply interconnected *not* by our free choice *but* by the self-interested, political, and arbitrary imperatives of global enterprises; *not* by genuine multiculturalism *but* by a homogeneous financial system; *not* in equal and harmonious status *but* in the ongoing structure of center-periphery; and *not* by dispersed, scattered hegemonies *but* by re-centering, re-organizing hegemonies of a handful 'experts' of "global speculators." *Nothing* seems "new" to me. *Everything* sounds too familiar to me.

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[94] Koshy, "The Political Dimensions and Implications of Globalization," 37.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Greider, *One World, Ready or Not?*, 23.
[97] Ibid., 245f.
[98] Ibid., 24-25.

Collecting and connecting resistances

Therefore, the more I delve into what Hall calls "new," "post," the more I find what Shohat calls the "historical and geographical links, structural analogies." The more I scrutinize what Hall calls "some other, related but as yet emergent new configurations of power-knowledge relations [that] are beginning to exert their distinctive and specific effects," the more I see what Shohat calls "the new *modes and forms* [my emphasis] of the old colonialist practices." The more I investigate the relationship between what Hall calls "new times in which both the crisis of the uncompleted struggle for 'decolonization' and the crisis of the 'post-independence' state are deeply inscribed" and what the same person again calls "the new developments in global capitalism," the more I realize that the latter, which is characterized by globalization, is the driving force behind the former, especially the crisis of the 'post-independence' state. We have to realize that in this era of globalization, the nation-state is by no means in decline, but rather it is being *transformed* according to the need of finance capital. In the Cold War context, the West had built the "development regimes" in the South. But, as Ninan Koshy observes, in the process of globalization the global finance capital orchestrated the alteration of the "development regimes" to the "debt regimes," which is more amiable to itself. A paramount historical irony is that more 'democratic' governments in the Third World, which after the Cold War substituted for dictatorial development regimes, are more obedient to the world's investors and more eager and voluntary to adjust their market to the global free market system.

Despite the notion that traditional expressions of nationhood are subverted by the borderless market, we are *not yet* living in a fully integrated global market. Greider himself admits that we are living *in between* the nation-state and a fully integrated global market. [99] In other words, the world is actually stuck halfway between them, as two centers of power tug against each other's values and priorities.[100] It is this 'tug of war' between the nation-state and a fully integrated global market that makes it difficult for many postcolonial intellectuals to feel "at home" any where. Feeling "no where," R.S. Sugirtharajah, an Indian scholar who employs postcolonial theory to assess biblical interpretative practices in the Asian context, desires to position himself in an alternative space:

> I think there is a third alternative: to position ourselves between and betwixt cultures and countries and engage in a processual hermeneutic. JanMohamed calls this limbo state the "interstitial cultural space." It is a vantage point from which those who are caught amidst several cultures and groups and are unable or unwilling to feel "at home" can come up with unlimited alternative forms of group identity and social arrangement. This is not only a mediating position among communities, cultures, and nations, but also enables us to subject cultures "to analytic scrutiny rather than combining them" (JanMohamed). It is in this uncolonialized space, *if there ever is one* [my

[99] Ibid., 251.
[100] Ibid.,

> italics], that contemporary hermeneutical praxis must reserve for itself the freedom to mix and harmonize, to change and retain various ingredients.[101]

Yes, if there ever is one! But, is there ever such an "uncolonialized space"? Is such a space firmly grounded, rooted, and based on the life, suffering, and struggle of the subalterns? Some of the distinctive characteristics of liberation theologies in/of the 'Third World' are: they openly claim not to be neutral but to side with the poor and the oppressed; they seek the transformation of societal structures, for the immensity of the suffering of the people demands the elimination of the root causes of oppression; and they commit to liberating the oppressed as the very first act of theology, so that theology becomes a critical reflection upon prior political commitment in solidarity with the oppressed. In short, the most original insight of 'Third World' theologies of liberation is to see the world *from the underside of history*, that is, from the perspective of the poor and suffering, the losers in history, not from an "uncolonialized space" or from an "interstitial cultural space," and to respond to this vision by searching for effective strategies to *transform the structures of societal sin* that are the root causes of their suffering.[102] Susan George tells us a story:

> The great untold story of the 1980s is how the people at the bottom, impacted by the massive redistribution of wealth from the poor regions of the South to the North, have managed to survive. How these peoples have actually survived and how they have resisted the forces of globalization, regimes of accumulation and colonizing forms of regulation is a source for alternative futures and social orders that is mined here. *Collecting and connecting these resistances to global capitalism is our task* [my emphasis].[103]

Any theory of politics of resistance should be based on the real resistance of the people, not on any abstract idea. As Said suggests, the study of human beings in society should be based on concrete human history and experience, not on donnish abstractions or on obscure laws of arbitrary systems.[104] Orientalism failed to identify with human experience and failed also to see it as human experience;[105] postcolonialism will fail if it follows the same wake.

Sandra Harding suggests that it is possible to speak of 'decolonization' and 'decolonizing' as a distinctive political and intellectual tendency *within* post-colonial space and their diverse discussions.[106] She affirms that such terms draw attention to the necessity of active intervention in still prevailing and powerful discourses, their institutions, and practices, in order to end the forms of colonialism and neocolonialism

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[101] R.S. Sugirtharajah, *Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism: Contesting the Interpretations* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1998), 109.
[102] Alfred T. Hennelly, ed., *Liberation Theology: A Documentary History* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995), xvi.
[103] Schroyer, *A World That Works*, 2.
[104] Said, *Orientalism*. 328.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Sandra Harding, *Is Science Multicultural?: Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 16.

that still structure most people's lives in the North and everywhere else around the globe.[107] She is convinced that such terms counter the tendency to think of the postcolonial as a kind of state of grace from which some lucky people benefit without exerting any political or intellectual effort.[108] Still, I am not sure whether it is possible to speak of 'decolonization' *within* 'postcolonial' space, if the latter is "a way of denying that." As Grewal and Laplan observe, "colonialism continues in various forms at the present time." Said insists that there is a solid basis in historical experience for the appearance today of interest in post-colonialism.[109] Still, as I have argued, I am not persuaded what kind of *solid basis* in historical experience attracts postcolonial theoretical shift.

Conclusion

I have argued what Hall himself admits, "some conceptual incompatibility"[110] of the 'post-colonial' as a certain kind of post-foundationalism that cannot meet the need of my particular historical struggle. After examining the value and limit of postcolonial theories as politics of resistance, I have insisted that we retain the term 'Third World,' for it still can symbolize "a common project of linked resistance to neo/colonialisms" and reaffirm "historical and geographical links, structural analogies, and opening for agency and resistance." After criticizing the liberal self-deception contained in such new fields as cultural studies and multiculturalism, I have emphasized that we should not concede defeat in the economic arena.

This does not mean that I deny the crisis in 'Third World' thinking which can flatten heterogeneities, mask contradictions, and elide differences. Indeed, the realization that "the wretched of the earth" are not unanimously revolutionary, and that conflicts are prevailing not only between nations but also within nations. In fact, the enthusiasm for the 'post-colonial' was in fact a mirror of the crisis in 'Third World' thinking itself. I realize that feminist scholarship including that of the postcolonial and third world feminists like Gayatri Spivak and Kowk Pui-lan should be further studied. At any rate, the 'post-colonial' gave me a question to ponder: Can 'Third World,' which is an old but still instigating symbol for "a common project of linked resistance to neo/colonialisms," refer to "a number of very complex and politically ambiguous developments"? If it is not '*post*-colonial,' what else could/should it be? In order to illuminate the whole aspects of systemic modes of domination, of overlapping collective identities, and of contemporary global relations, we need open ourselves and continue to develop a new frame of thought that can name, empower, and connect people's (minjung's) resistance to global capitalism today.

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[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid., 349.
[110] Hall, "When Was 'The Post-Colonial?," 258.

Abstract

'Third World' theologies of liberation fell into crisis when the term 'Third World' itself became problematic. It is criticized that such a three world theory flattens heterogeneities, masks contradictions, and elides differences. Accordingly, we have seen the rise of 'postcolonial' studies and theories ever since the 1980s. This is nothing but a mirror of the crisis in 'Third World' thinking.

The earliest studies of the post-colonial, according to the author, were based on studies of domination and control done from the standpoint of political and liberationist project. However, the postcolonial theories thereafter have not addressed the politics of location of the very term 'post-colonial' itself; i.e., their denial of capitalism's foundational status makes postcolonial arguments mere culturalism.

Interrogating the 'post' in the 'postcolonial,' the author criticizes that in postcolonial theories the consideration of the relationship between postcolonialism and global capitalism is remarkably lacking. All cultural analyses that ignore the basic mechanism of global capitalism simply fall into the pitfall of culturalism. One basic common history of global capitalism, emphasizes the author, is the historic subordination of indigenous peoples and cultures to the 'civilizing mission' of Western nationalism in the form of imperialism. Thus, we must escape from the liberal self-deception contained in many cultural studies and multiculturalism today.

After investigating the history of globalization, the author suggests that we retain the term 'Third World,' for with all its problems, it still does retain heuristic value as a convenient label for the imperialized formations, including those within the First World. A flexible yet critical usage of 'Third World,' ascertains the author, can denote a common project of linked resistance to neo/colonialism and reaffirm historical and geographical links, structural analogies, and above all opening for new agency and resistance.

In fact, all categories leak. In order to illuminate the whole aspects of systemic modes of domination, of overlapping collective identities, and of contemporary global relations, the author urges that that we need to open ourselves and continue to struggle to ponder a better frame of thought that can name, empower, and connect people's (minjung's) resistance to global capitalism today. The remaining questions are: Can 'Third World,' which is an old but still instigating symbol for a common project of linked resistance to neo/colonialisms, can refer to a number of very complex and politically ambiguous developments? If it is not '*post*-colonial,' what else could/should it be?

Keyword

Third World, Postcolonial, Neocolonial, Liberation Theology, People(Minjung)

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